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Abstract. The paper introduces the Secure kNN (SkNN) approach to
data classification and querying. The approach is founded on the con-
cept of Secure Chain Distance Matrices (SCDMs) whereby the classi-
fication and querying is entirely delegated to a third party data miner
without sharing either the original dataset or individual queries. Privacy
is maintained using two property preserving encryption schemes, a ho-
momorphic encryption scheme and bespoke order preserving encryption
scheme. The proposed solution provides advantages of: (i) preserving the
data privacy of the parties involved, (ii) preserving the confidentiality of
the data owner encryption key, (iii) hiding the query resolution process
and (iv) providing for scalability with respect to alternative data min-
ing algorithms and alternative collaborative data mining scenarios. The
results indicate that the proposed solution is both efficient and effective
whilst at the same time being secure against potential attack.
Keywords: Secure kNN query, Homomorphic encryption, Secure Chain
Distance Matrices, Order preserving encryption.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the adoption of cloud services to
store and manage data. There has been an increasing tendency for Data Owners
(DOs), enterprises of all kinds, to outsource their data storage to Cloud Service
Providers (CSPs) according to some contractual agreement. However, there are
increasing concerns that sensitive data, belonging to the DOs, may be inadver-
tently exposed or misused [30]. These concerns are compounded by legislative
requirements for data privacy preservation [6, 11]. This has motivated DOs to
encrypt their data prior to outsourcing to CSPs so that the privacy of sensitive
information is guaranteed [24].
Although encryption addresses the above data confidentiality issue it imposes
limitations on the functionality of the operations that can be applied to the data
in that the data can only be processed (queried) by the DOs who are in possession
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of the encryption keys. There is also an increasing desire, on behalf of DOs, for
the benefits of data mining and machine learning to be leveraged from their data.
Many CSPs provide a Data Mining as a Service (DMaaS) [5] facility. However,
the standard encryption techniques used to preserve data confidentiality means
that the application of any data mining task will necessitate some form of data
decryption. The research domain of Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
seeks to address this issue [1, 15].
A variety of PPDM methods have been proposed, including: data anonymi-
sation [26], perturbation [19, 33] and the utilisation of Secure Multi-Party Com-
putation (SMPC) protocols [10]. Using data anonymisation, DOs will remove
“personal” attributes that are deemed confidential from the data and then ir-
reversibly generalised the remaining dataset according to some “syntactic” con-
dition. However, examples of breaches data confidentiality, reported in [22, 28,
29], have shown that anonymised data can be “de-anonymised” using quasi-
identifier attributes and “linkage attacks” [22]. Data perturbation (or transfor-
mation) operates by distorting or randomising the entire dataset by adding noise
while maintaining the statistical makeup of the data. However, perturbing the
data cannot entirely assure data privacy since most of the methods used allow
“reverse engineering” of the original data distribution [13]. Perturbation meth-
ods and data anonymisation have also been shown to be unsuitable for many
instances of DMaaS; it has been demonstrated that they adversely affect the
accuracy of the data analysis [19, 27]. The SMPC-based approach is directed at
analysis tasks where the data is distributed, not encrypted, across a number of
participating parties; such as a number of DOs, or a single DO and several Query
Users (QUs). The SMPC-based approach requires many intermediate computa-
tions, using a dedicated SMPC protocol, performed over non-encrypted data
and using DO and/or QU local resources, the statistical results of which are
then shared. The significant computational and communication overhead that
is a feature of the SMPC-based approach has rendered the approach to be in-
feasible for large datasets and complex data mining activities. Moreover, when
using a SMPC-based approach, the involvement of many DOs and/or QUs poses
a security risk given the presence of a non-honest party who may launch attacks
such as “overlapping attacks” [18] and Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (CPAs) [34].
These PPDM methods do not therefore provide a solution to the desire of DOs
to take advantage of the benefits offered by CSPs in a manner whereby data con-
fidentiality can be guaranteed while at the same time allowing the techniques of
data analytics to be applied to their data.
The emergence of Property Preserving Encryption (PPE) schemes, such as
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [17], Asymmetric Scalar Product Preserving
Encryption (ASPE) [31] and Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [16, 20], has
provided a potential solution to the disadvantages associated with PPDM by
permitting cyphertext manipulation without decryption. HE schemes allow sim-
ple mathematical operations, such as addition and multiplication, to be applied
over encrypted data. ASPE schemes preserve scalar distances across cyphertexts.
OPE schemes permit cyphertext comparison. However, although PPE schemes
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go someway to providing a solution to secure DMaaS they do not provide a
complete solution in that, given a particular data mining application, the math-
ematical operations that are required are currently not all provided by single
PPE scheme. This limitation has been addressed in the literature by either: (i)
recourse to data owners whenever unsupported operations are required or (ii)
confiding the secret key to non-colluding parties using either a secret sharing
techniques, as the case of [23], or using two-distinct CSPs as in the case of [25].
The former solution clearly introduces a computation and communication over-
head which renders the approach unsuitable for many instances of DMaaS. In
the case of the latter, the existence of two non-colluding parties is not always
applicable while at the same time raising security concerns for many DOs as the
secret key cannot be revoked even when a party is found to be untrustworthy.
The solution presented in this paper is to use two complementary PPE schemes
which collectively provide the necessary operations without compromising data
confidentiality. More specifically, the proposed solution uses two PPEs: Liu’s HE
scheme [17] and bespoken Frequency and Distribution Hiding Order Preserving
Encryption (FDH-OPE) scheme.
In the context of previous work directed at the use of PPE schemes, a pop-
ular DMaaS application, because of its simplicity and because it is used with
respect to many application domains [25], is k Nearest Neighbour (kNN) clas-
sification/querying [7]. Given a query record q and a prelabeled dataset D held
by a CSP, the standard kNN approach, where k = 1, operates by finding the
class label for the most similar record in D to q, and assigning this label to q.
Where k > 1, kNN operates by finding the “major” class label amongst k near-
est records and assigning this to q. The challenges here is not just efficient data
privacy preservation in the context the dataset D belonging to the DO, but also
the efficient data privacy preservation associated with the query set Q (or sets
{q1, q2, . . . }). The general view is that the query process should be controllable
by the DO to whom the prelabeled dataset D belongs. This means that any QU
cannot encrypt the records in their query set without first being “approved” by
the DO. In many proposed solutions [12, 31, 32, 35, 38] the DO is required to ei-
ther: disclose the encryption key (or at least part of it) to the QUs so as to allow
them to encrypt Q, or disclose the key to a Third Party Data Miner (TPDM)
which in turn means QUs have to disclose Q to the TPDM (the CSP). Both
approaches entail a potential security risk, either because of the wide distribu-
tion of the encryption key across QUs or because of the requirement to treat the
TPDM as a trusted party. Another challenge is in how to determine securely the
data similarity between the records in Q and the records in D. To address the
data similarity challenge various techniques have been proposed which rely ei-
ther on HE schemes that provide only a partial solution and consequently entail
recourse to data owners, or make use of SMPC primitives that required DO and
QU participation and thus entail an undesired computation and communication
overhead.
The work presented in this paper proposes the Secure kNN classification/
querying (SkNN) system. The idea is to encrypt the dataset D using Liu’s HE
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scheme [17] while at the same time recasting the dataset into a proxy format.
More specifically as a Chain Distance Matrix (CDM), of the form first intro-
duced in [3], which is then encrypted using a proposed FDH-OPE scheme to
give a Secure CDM (SCDM). By allowing the two encryption schemes to work
in tandem the disadvantages associated with earlier approaches reliant on a sin-
gle encryption scheme are avoided, and hence SkNN can process queries without
requiring data owner participation or recourse to SMPC protocols as in the case
of earlier solutions. To ensure data confidentiality the encryption keys are held
by the DO and never confided with the QUs or the TPDM. The QUs encrypt
their query set Q using a proposed Secure Query Cyphering (SQC) protocol that
preserves the privacy of the query record and the confidentiality of the DO’s pri-
vate key. The query process is controllable by the DO, although undertaken by
the TPDM without involving the QUs or DO. The proposed SkNN system is
fully described and evaluated in the remainder of this paper.
2 Previous Work
This section presents a review of previous work directed at secure kNN data
classification and kNN querying. The existing work is directed at different kNN
querying scenarios and different level of party involvement, however it can be
categorised according to the data confidentiality preserving technique adopted:
(i) cryptography [12, 31, 34, 36, 38, 39], (ii) data perturbation [32, 35] and (iii)
SMPC protocols [9]. In most cases three categories of party are considered: (i)
a Third Party Data Miner (TPDM); (ii) a Data Owner (DO) and (iii) one or
more authorised Query Users (QUs) who are permitted to query the outsourced
data so as to label their own query records (the set Q). In the remainder of
this previous work section a number of previously proposed exemplar secure
kNN data classification/querying techniques are discussed, each representing a
particular approach in the context of the above categorisation.
In [12] the HE scheme presented in [8] was used to encrypt the DO’s data.
The encrypted dataset was then outsourced to authorised QUs along with the
encryption key whilst the decryption key was sent to the TPDM. The secure kNN
data classification was collaboratively conducted by the QUs and the TPDM,
thus the query process was not controlled by the DO, therefore raising security
concerns. Also the approach featured a considerable communication overhead
as a result of interactions between the QUs and the TPDM while qeuries were
being process; most of the computation was conducted using the QUs’ local
resources. A general principle of DMaaS is that the QU and/or DO should not
need to be involved in the processing of a query once the query is launched,
the mechanism presented in [12] does not support this principle. Wong et al.
[31] proposed an Asymmetric Scalar Product Preserving Encryption (ASPE)
scheme which used a random invertible matrix to encrypt the outsourced data.
The APSE scheme supported scalar product operations over cyphertext which
were used to calculate Euclidean distances between encrypted data records and
encrypted query records. However, in this approach the QUs have access to
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the DO’s encryption and decryption keys, hence the DO’s data privacy may
not be preserved. A similar approach was presented in [38], but providing some
limitation on the information concerning encryption keys provided to QUs.
The work presented in [39] addresses the risk of encryption key leakage from
QUs; however, the QUs can still learn the partial sum of the numbers in the
encryption key belonging to the DO using a legal query, the QUs can also launch
uncontrolled queries (queries that are processed without DO approval). Yuan et
al. [36] present a secure kNN (k = 1) query scheme to address the threat of
untrusted QUs and/or TPDMs; however, the QUs directly submit private plain
query records to the DO which means that query privacy is not preserved. More
recently, Zhu et al. [37] demonstrated that the scheme presented in [36] cannot
achieve their declared security, and that the encrypted dataset in [36] can be
quickly compromised by untrusted QUs and/or TPDMs.
In [35] a transformation method is used to encode the DO data outsourced
to the TPDM. However, as in the case in [31, 38], the QUs have access to the
encryption and decryption keys, therefore they are assumed to be fully trusted.
The trusted QUs encrypt their data records and send queries to the TPDM who
conducts an approximate similarity search on the transformed data. The search
results are then sent back to the QUs who decrypt the results and determine
the label of their query records. The work in [32, 34] presents various schemes
to securely support approximate kNN for a given query record. In [34], the se-
cure kNN is executed by retrieving the approximated nearest records instead of
finding the encrypted exact k-nearest neighbours that requires the QUs to be
involved in a substantial amount of computation during the query processing
step. The method presented in [34] considers the TPDM as a provider of stor-
age space, no significant work is done by the TPDM. In [32], Random Space
(RASP) data perturbation combined with order preserving features are used to
preserve data privacy and allow secure kNN querying. Confiding the encryp-
tion and decryption key to QUs, or to the TPDM as in the case of [31, 32, 34,
35], significantly increase the risk of key leakage (it is also difficult to revoke a
key distributed to QUs should they be deemed untrustworthy). Thus raising a
significant security concern, as detailed in [34], whereby QUs can launch Chosen-
Plaintext Attacks (CPAs). The QUs are assumed to be completely trusted QUs;
this not only in limits the application scope of this approach, but also raises
several practical problems. In general, the existing secure kNN query schemes
where QUs can access the DO’s encryption key are still far from being practical
in many situations.
3 System Model
This section introduces the system model and design goals for the proposed
Secure kNN classification/querying (SkNN) system. As in the case of earlier work
on secure kNN the proposed system features three types of participant: a DO, a
TPDM and several QUs as shown in Figure 1. The TPDM is assumed to have a
large but bounded storage and computation capability, and provides outsourcing
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storage and computation services, for example the TPDM might be a CSP. The
DO has a large privet dataset D which consists of r records, D = {d1, . . . , dr}.
Each record di has a+1 attribute values; di = {di,1, . . . , di,a, di,a+1} where di,a+1
is the class label for data record di. The QUs are a set of authorised parties who
want to classify their data records Q = {q1, q2, . . . }. The DO encrypts D using
Liu’s HE scheme (presented later in Section 4) to arrive at D′ and sends it to the
TPDM so as to take advantage of storage resources and computational ability
provided by TPDM as a service. Note that the class label (attribute value a+ 1)
for each record in D is not encrypted. The DO also generates a Secure Chain
Distance Matrix (SCDM) encrypted using the proposed FDH-OPE scheme that
facilitates secure data similarity determination, this is presented in further detail
in Sections 4 and 5.
The DO delegates the generation of a kNN classification model, using its
encrypted outsourced data, to the TPDM, and allows QUs to take advantage
of the developed model. To maintain privacy any query qi ∈ Q needs to be en-
crypted by the QU who owns the query, before it is submitted to the TPDM for
processing. Clearly to allow qi to be processed using the kNN model generated
using the DO’s encrypted data, qi needs to be encrypted using the same encryp-
tion key (held by the DO). Query encryption is thus achieved using a proposed
Secure Query Cyphering (SQC) protocol that preserves the privacy of the query
record and the confidentiality of DO’s private key. To determine the similarity
between an encrypted query record q′i and the encrypted kNN model requires q
′
i
to be processed in such a way that it is integrated with the SCDM, a process
referred to as “binding”. The secure binding process is presented in Section 6.
To make ensure that the querying is controlled by the DO, the binding process
requires two records, one generated by the QU (BindRec1) and the other gener-
ated by the DO that handles query approval (BindRec2). Once approved query
processing is delegated entirely to the TPDM. At the end of which the QU will
receive predicted class label for qi (see Figure 1).
Query Users (QUs)









Fig. 1. The SkNN system architecture
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4 Cryptographic Preliminaries
As noted above the proposed SkNN data classification and query process oper-
ates using two encryption schemes: (i) the FDH-OPE scheme used to encrypt
SCDMs and (ii) Liu’s HE scheme used to encrypt the DO’s outsourced data and
securely exchange the FDH-OPE keys using a dedicated SQC protocol. Both
are discussed in further detail in the following two sub-sections, Sub-sections 4.1
and 4.2 respectively.
4.1 Frequency and Distribution Hiding Order Preserving
Encryption (FDH-OPE)
This sub-section presents the FDH-OPE scheme used to encrypt CDMs, an or-
der preserving scheme. The proposed scheme is an amalgamation of two existing
Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) schemes, that of [20] and [16]. The former
used to hide the data distribution in generated cyphertexts, the latter used to
hide the data frequency. Encrypting data so that the data distribution is hidden
requires knowledge of the distribution within the plaintext data, the plaintext
intervals where the data density is high, and then generating the cyphertexts
in such a way that high density plaintext intervals are dispersed along large
cyphertext intervals. The frequency of data is simply hidden by generating dif-
ferent cyphers for the same plaintext value (even when using the same encryption
key). The first step in FDH-OPE, is to determine the “interval” of the message
space M = [l, h) and the expanded “interval” of the cypher space C = [l′, h′) in
such a way that M  C and the l, l′, and h, h′, are the minimum and maximum
interval boundaries for the message and cypher spaces respectively (see Figure
2). Data distribution hiding comprises two steps, message space splitting and
non-linear cypher space expansion which operate as follows:
Message space splitting: The DO randomly splits the message space interval
M into t consecutive intervals; M = {m1, . . . ,mt}, where t is a random
number. The length of intervals are determined randomly by deciding the
minimum and maximum interval boundaries (Figure 2). The data density for
each interval is then calculated as Dens = {dens1, . . . , denst} where densi
is density of data in message space mi.
Non-linear cypher space expansion: The DO then splits the cypher space
C into t intervals; C = {c1, . . . , ct}. So that the data distribution is hidden,
the length of each cypher space interval ci is determined according to the den-
sity of the data in the corresponding message space interval, densi, so that
message space intervals with high data density will have large correspond-
ing cypher space intervals. For example, if densi > densj then |ci| > |cj |.
The message space and cypher space interval boundaries are the FDH-OPE
encryption keys.
The data frequency is hidden using a “one-to-many” encryption function that
maps x ∈ mi to an OPE equivalent value x′ ∈ ci. Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo
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Algorithm 1 FDH-OPE encryption algorithm
1: procedure Enci(x, Sens)
2: i← IntervalID(x)









6: δi = Random(0, Sens× scalei)
7: x′ = l′i + scalei × (x− li) + δi
8: Exit with x′
9: end procedure
code for the encrypting function. The algorithm commences by determining the
message space interval ID, i, within which x is contained (line 2). The interval
boundaries (keys) of the ith message and cypher space are then retrieved in lines
3 and 4. These values are used to calculate interval scalei and sample random
value δi as per lines 5 and 6, where Sens is a data sensitivity value representing
the minimum distance between plaintext values in the dataset to be encrypted
(calculated as specified in [16]). The value of δi is sampled for each interval so
that longer intervals with a larger scalei value will consequently have a larger
δi value than in the case of shorter intervals which contribute toward the hiding
of the data distribution. The algorithm will exit (line 8) with cyphertext x′
calculated as in line 7. The random value δi is added so that identical attribute





l = l1 h1 li hi
xi
Enc(xi)




























Fig. 2. Message and cypher space splitting
4.2 Liu’s Homomorphic Encryption
The Liu’s scheme is a symmetric HE scheme that supports cypher addition ⊕,
cypher multiplication ⊗ and the multiplication of cyphertexts by plaintext values
∗. Given a data attribute value v, this is encrypted to m sub-cyphers; E={e1, . . . ,
em} where m > 3. The same key (Key) is used for the encryption and decryption
processes; Key(m) = [(k1, s1, t1), . . . , (km, sm, tm)]. The key generation process
is as presented in [17]. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code for the encryption
process, Encrypt(v,Key(m)). The pseudo code for the data decryption process,
Decrypt(C,Key(m)), is given in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 2 Liu’s HE encryption algorithm
1: procedure Encrypt(v,Key(m))
2: R = [r[1], ..., r[m−1]], list of real random numbers
3: E = Real value array of m elements
4: e1 = k1 × t1 × v + s1 × rm + k1 × (r1 − rm−1)
5: for i = 2 to m− 1 do
6: ei = ki × ti × v + si × rm + ki × (ri − ri−1)
7: end for
8: em = (km + sm + tm)× rm
9: Exit with E
10: end procedure












5: Exit with v
6: end procedure
Liu’s scheme has both security and homomorphic properties. The scheme
is semantically secure in that it produces different cyphertexts for the same
plaintext on each occasion, even when the same secret key is used. Further
detail regarding the security of Liu’s scheme is given in Section 7. In terms of
its homomorphic properties, as noted above, the scheme support ⊕, ⊗ and ∗
as shown in Equation 1 (where c is a plaintext value), and thus, by extension,
supports cypher subtraction 	 and division  as shown in Equation 2.
E ⊕ E′ = {e1 ⊕ e′1, . . . , em ⊕ e′m} = v + v′
E ⊗ E′ = {e1 ⊗ e′1, . . . , e1 ⊗ e′m, . . . em ⊗ e′1, . . . , em ⊗ e′m} = v × v′
c ∗ E = {c ∗ e1, . . . , c ∗ em} = c× v
(1)
E 	 E′ = E ⊕ (−1 ∗ E′)
c E = 1
c
∗ E (2)
5 Secure Chain Distance Matrices (SCDMs)
Liu’s scheme described above, does not preserve the data ordering in the gener-
ated cyphers. Therefore record comparison, an operation frequently required by
many data mining algorithms, cannot be directly applied. To facilitate cypher-
text comparison the idea of SCDM, presented recently in [3], was adopted. For
the purposed of completeness the SCDM concept is presented in this section.
A SCDM is a 2D matrix that holds the encrypted distances between the
attribute values in every consecutive data records in a dataset D in whatever
ordering the records appear in the dataset. Therefore, the first dimension is r−1,
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where r is the number of records in D, and the second is the size of the attribute
set a. A SCDM has a linear chain feature that allows secure derivation of the
distances between any pair of data records held in the SCDM without decryp-
tion, while at the same time requiring less storage space than that required by
alternative distance matrix formalisms, such as the Updatable Distance Matrices
(UDMs) proposed in [2]. Given a SCDM a TPDM can determine the similarity
between two records, rx and ry, where x 6= y as per Equation 3. In the case of
x = y the distance will clearly be 0. The SCDM is generated in two steps: (i)
CDM calculation and (ii) CDM encryption:
CDM Calculation: Algorithm 4 gives the CDM Calculation process. The al-
gorithm starts by dimensioning the desired CDM (line 2) according to the
dimensions of D received as an input. As noted above, the first dimension is
the number of records in dataset minus one (r−1) and the second is the size
of attributes set (a). The CDM elements are then populated (lines 3 to 7);
element CDMi,j will hold the distance between the jth attribute value in
record i and the same attribute value in record i+ 1 (this can be a negative
value).
CDM Encryption: The CDM, as the case of the UDM presented in [2], is
essentially a set of linear equation that may support reverse engineering. To
preclude the potential of reverse engineering, the CDM needs to be encrypted
in such a way that the data distribution and frequency are hidden, while at
the same time preserving the ordering in the generated cyphertexts. To this
end, the FDH-OPE scheme described in Sub-section 4.1 above was used.
The key feature of the encrypted CDM, the SCDM, is that a TPDM now
has access to the “distances value ordering” facilitated by the FDH-OPE
scheme, but not the original distance values, between the data records. This
means that the TPDM can calculate the order of difference between records.








Algorithm 4 CDM calculation
1: procedure CDMCalculation(D)
2: CDM = ∅ array of r − 1 rows and a column
3: for i = 1 to i = r − 1 do
4: for j = 1 to j = a do
5: CDMi,j = di,j − di+1,j
6: end for
7: end for
8: Exit with CDM
9: end procedure
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6 Secure Query Processing over Encrypted Data with
Query Controllability and Key Confidentiality
This section presents the proposed SkNN data classification and SkNN data
querying process designed to achieve the key security requirements of: (i) key
confidentiality from QUs, (ii) query controllability, (iii) data privacy and (iv)
query privacy ; without involving the DO and/or QUs while a query is processed
and at the same time maintaining the efficiency and accuracy of the data classifi-
cation. The solution is founded on the concept of SCDMs as described in Section
5. The proposed SkNN algorithm consists of three main steps as follows:
1. Query encryption: The secure encryption of the QU’s query record to
preserve privacy, while maintaining DO encryption key confidentiality. To
this end the Secure Query Cyphering (SQC) protocol is used, described in
further detail in Sub-section 6.1.
2. Binding process: The “binding” of the encrypted query q′ with the SCDM
to allow the data similarity between the contents of D′ and q′ to be deter-
mined. The binding process is detailed in Sub-section 6.2 below.
3. SkNN data classification: Query resolution (classification) conducted in
two further steps: (i) nearest neighbour records retrieval and (ii) major class
label determination. Both are discussed further in Sub-section 6.3.
6.1 Secure Query Cyphering (SQC) Protocol
The SQC protocol operates between the DO and QUs and is designed to allow
the QUs to encrypt a query record, qi = {qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,a}, using FDH-OPE, so
that a “binding” record can be generated which in turn is utilised by the TPDM
to update its SCDM. The binding process and the updating of the SCDM is dis-
cussed in the following sub-section, this sub-section presents the SQC protocol.
To encrypt the query record qi, using the FDH-OPE scheme, QU requires the
FDH-OPE key. As FDH-OPE is a symmetric scheme, that uses the same key
for encryption and decryption, sharing the key with the QU presents a security
risk. The idea, instead of providing the FDH-OPE key, is therefore to provide
the QU with the parameters to allow FDH-OPE encryption. However, provision
of these parameters still presents a security threat. Therefore the parameters are
encrypted using Liu’s Scheme; recall that this is an HE scheme whose functional-
ity will allow FDH-OPE encryption of qi without decryption of the parameters.
In effect qi will be double encrypted, firstly using FDH-OPE to give q
′
i, and
secondly using Liu’s scheme to give q′′i . Note that the Liu HE scheme keys used
with respect to the SQC protocol is different to the Liu HE scheme keys used
to encrypt D (see Section 3). To distinguish between the two, the former will be
referred to as the Shared Liu scheme (shared because later in the SkNN process
it is shared with the TPDM).
Recall that Using FDH-OPE a value x is encrypted as follows (line 7 of
Algorithm 1):
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x′ = l′j + scalej × (x− lj) + δj (4)
where l′j is the minimum bound for the cypher space interval in question, scalej
is the required scaling between the message space interval and the corresponding
cypher space interval, and δj is a noise value included to prevent identical values
being encrypted in the same way on repeated encryptions. The above can be
rewritten as follows (with noise δj removed):
x′ = scalej × (x) + (l′j − (scalej × (lj)) (5)
which can be further simplified to
x′ = scalej × (x) + ej (6)
where ej = l
′
j − (scalej × (lj)). The parameters scalej and ej are calculated by
the DO, encrypted using the Shared Liu scheme to give scale′j and e
′
j , and sent
to the relevant QU. Of course the values of scalej and ej are dependent on the
interval in which x falls; thus this also needs to be established within the context
of the SQC protocol. The SQC protocol to achieve the above can be summarised
as follows:
SQC Protocol: Secure Query Cyphering
1: DO generates the Shared Liu key.
2: Using binary questioning with the QU, DO identifies the FDH-OPE interval ID
within which each query attribute value in qi,j ∈ qi is contained.
3: DO calculates the FDH-OPE values for scalej and ej for each attribute value qi,j .




5: DO sends scale′j and e
′
j to QU.
6: Using scale′j and e
′
j , QU double encrypts the query attribute values in qi,j ∈ qi
using the HE properties of Liu’s scheme as per Equation 7, the result is q′′i .
q′′i,j = (qi,j ∗ scale′)⊕ e′ (7)
6.2 QU Authorisation and Binding
The binding process is the process whereby a query record is incorporated into
the SCDM held by the TPDM. Recall that the SCDM contains distances (dif-
ferences) between corresponding attribute values in a pairs of records. What we
wish to do is add the difference between the first record in D held by the DO
and the query record q held by the QU without sending either to the TPDM.
The binding process is a collaborative process between the DO and a QU, and is
required not only to allow a response to QU’s query, but also so that the query
can be authorised by the DO.
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The process starts with the DO generating a random record p of length
a, p = {p1, . . . , pa}. This is then encrypted twice, firstly using the FDH-OPE
scheme to give p′, and secondly using the Shared Liu scheme to give p′′, which
is then sent to the relevant QU. The double encryption is required because, to
retain the confidentiality of the FDH-OPE key held by the DO, qi is also double
encrypted. QU will then generate a binding record BindRec1 representing the
difference between their double encrypted query record q′′and the p′′. This is
achieved using the Shared Liu scheme properties, thus BindRec′′1= q
′′ 	 p′′ (as
described in Sub-section 4.2). The binding record BindRec1 is then sent to the
TPDM (see Figure 1). At the same time the DO will calculate the binding record
BindRec2, representing the distances between p
′ (single encryption using FDH-
OPE) and the first record in their dataset D, also encrypted using FDH-OPE.
The binding record, BindRec2, encrypted using FDH-OPE to give BindRec
′
2, is
then sent to the TPDM. The receipt of BindRec′2 by the TPDM from the DO
signals “approval” for the query, without this the TPDM will not process the
query. The role of DO and QU is now finished.
Once the TPDM has received BindRec′′1 and BindRec
′
2, the TPDM decrypts
the double encrypted BindRec′′1 , using the Shared Liu scheme, to give BindRec
′
1.
Both binding records remain encrypted using FDH-OPE. The TPDM then cre-
ates a Pivot record by adding BindRec′1 to BindRec
′
2. The Pivot record will now
hold the distance between the query record q and the first record in d1 ∈ D
without either being confided to the TPDM, or each other. The pivot record
is then added to the SCDMs. The similarity between the query record qi (at










6.3 Third Party Data Classification
The processing (classification) of queries from an authorised QUs (note that the
DO may also be a QU) is entirely delegated to the TPDM (CSP). The main
purpose of using a TPDM is because: (i) the limited computing resource and
technical expertise that DOs are anticipated to have, the assumption is that
the DO’s core business is not data analytics, but some other form of commerce
where data is generated which the DO is prepared to share for commercial gain;
and (ii) that DOs and QUs are likely to want avail themselves of the analyti-
cal capabilities offered using a mobile device of some kind. Using a TPDM for
query resolution also provides the additional benefit that query outcomes are
not shared with the DO. Algorithm 6 shows the pseudo code for SkNN data
classification. The inputs are: (i) the SCDM on completion of the binding pro-
cess whereby the distance between the query record and the first record in D
has been inserted at index 1 (SCDM1), (ii) the encrypted dataset D
′ and (iii)
the desired value for k. The SkNN process comprises two stages: (i) secure NN
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retrieval (lines 2 to 5) and (ii) determination of the major class label (line 7
which call procedure given in lines 10 to 17). The first stage starts with the cal-
culation of the similarity between query record q′ and each other record d′j ∈ D′
as per Equation 8. The calculated distance, together with the associated class
label held at d′j,a+1, is added to the neighbour list N (line 5). The second stage,
determining the major class label, is commenced by ordering the neighbour list
according to the dist values (line 11). Recall that the FDH-OPE scheme used to
encrypt the SCDM is an order preserving encryption scheme, thus facilitating
secure data ordering. The first k elements in the neighbour list are then used to
create list C that holds counts of the number of records in the first k elements
in N that correspond to each label featured in the first k elements in N . The
maximum class label is returned as the query label (line 13).
Algorithm 6 Secure kNN classification algorithm
1: procedure SkNN(SCDM , D′,k)
2: N = ∅
3: for j = 1 to j = |D′| do
4: dist = Sim(SCDM, 1, j)
5: N = N ∪ < dist, d′[j,a+1] >
6: end for
7: predictedClass = majorClassLabel(N, k)
8: Exit with predictedClass
9: end procedure
10: procedure majorClassLabel(N, k)
11: Order N using N < dist >
12: C = {c1, . . . , cl}
13: for i = 1 to i = k do
14: c[Ni<label>] = c[Ni<label>] + 1
15: end for
16: Exit with Max(C)
17: end procedure
7 Experimental Evaluation
The evaluation of the SkNN system, including the SCDM, the binding process
and the SQC protocol, is presented in this section. For the evaluation both
synthetic data and fifteen datasets from the UCI data repository [14] were used,
the latter listed in Table 2. The objectives were to consider the proposed solution
in terms of: (i) computation and communication costs on behalf of the DO, (ii)
computation and communication costs on behalf of QUs, (iii) performance in
terms of runtime, (iv) classifcation accuracy, (v) the security of the proposed
approach and (vi) scalability; each discussed in detail in Sub-sections 7.1 to 7.6.
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7.1 DO Cost Analysis
The DO will participate in preparing data for the TPDM, running the SQC pro-
tocol and authorising QU queries. As noted earlier, there is no DO involvement
in the processing of QU queries once authorisation has taken place. The data
preparation encompasses: (i) the generation of secret keys, (ii) data encryption,
(iii) CDM calculation and (iv) CDM encryption to produce a SCDM.
Key generation is a one time process that does not add any overhead on behalf
of the DO. Experiments demonstrated that the average time required to generate
the FDH-OPE encryption keys was 80.32ms, whilst the Liu’s HE scheme keys
were generated in 1.39ms. The magnitude of the remaining DO participation is
dependant on the size of the DO’s dataset. Therefore, twenty synthetic dataset
of differing size where used; ten synthetic datasets were directed at evaluating
the effect of the number of data records (r) and the remaining ten were directed
at evaluating the effect of the number of data attributes (a). The size of the
targeted dimension (r or a) was increasing from 1K to 10K in steps of 1K, while
the other dimension was kept constant at 100. The results are shown in Figure 3.
As expected, the average runtime required to encrypt D, generate the CDM and
encrypt the CDM increases linearly as the size of r and a increases. For example,
when r = 1K the data was encrypted in 6.88ms; the CDM was generated in
63.73ms and encrypted in 168.04ms, when r = 10K the corresponding runtimes
are 19.00ms, 468.31ms and 1101.37ms. The recorded runtimes when a = 1K were
3.81ms, 60.7ms and 158.57ms, compared to 18.24ms, 569.99ms and 1225.79ms
when a = 10K. These results shown that regardless of dataset size, at least
in the context of the conducted experiments, the runtime associated with DO
participation was not significant and therefore does not introduce any limiting
overhead with respect to the DO.
The SQC protocol requires DO participation in determining and encrypting
the scale scale and e values required by FDH-OPE scheme so as to allow QUs to
encrypt their queries. The runtimes for calculating scale and encrypting e were
0.16ms and 0.11ms respectively, which means that no significant computational
overhead is encountered by the DO. The DO also participates in the generation
and encryption of the binding record BindRec2, this also does not introduces
any significant overhead. Table 1 shows the recorded runtimes (ms) for different
dimension of BindRec2 records.
7.2 QU Cost Analysis
The QU participates in the SQC protocol to encrypt their query records and
compute the binding record, BindRec1, that is compared to the DO’s binding
record, BindRec2, to produce the Pivot record to be included in the SCDM held
by the TPDM. This novel approach allows the TPDM to securely resolve the
QU’s query without involving the DO or QU. Table 1 shows the time required to
encrypt a range of query records of increasing length (number of attributes) and
the time required by a QU to calculate a binding record BindRec1. Inspection
of the table indicates that the runtimes are negligible.
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Fig. 3. Average runtimes (ms) for data encryption, CDM generation and CDM en-
cryption using a range of values for r (number of records) and a (number of attributes)
7.3 Performance of SkNN
The runtime required to classify data using the proposed SkNN approach was
compared with the runtime required for the standard kNN algorithm operating
over un-encrypted data. Figure 4 shows the average recorded runtimes required
to classify the datasets for the two stages of the kNN algorithm: secure NN
retrieval (Stage 1) and determination of the major class label (Stage 2). The
x-axis gives the evaluation dataset ID number from Table 2. The reported run-
time were measured in terms of average runtime obtained using Ten-fold Cross
Validation (TCV). As expected, the overall time required for SkNN Stage 1 was
longer than in the case of standard approach. Note that runtimes for (standard)
kNN Stage 1 are reported in millisecond (ms), while runtimes for SkNN Stage 1
are reported in second (sec). The experiment shows that, the bigger the dataset
the larger the SCDM, and consequently the greater the time required to interact
with the SCDM to classify a record. However, inspection of the recorded results
Table 1. Average runtimes (ms) for DO and QU participation when generating binding
records and encrypting the query in the context of different values of a (number of
attribute values)
a
1K 2K 3K 4K 5K 6K 7K 8K 9K 10K
Encrypt query record
(DO and QU)
4.42 6.11 10.77 11.28 11.58 13.41 14.24 15.5 17.76 18.89
Generate and encrypt
the BindRec1(QU)
2.32 5.02 6.33 6.94 8.75 9.27 9.37 11.4 11.61 13.77
Generate and encrypt
the BindRec2(DO)
2.38 4.23 9.47 7.03 8.9 9.85 12.04 13.94 15.62 16.38
Secure Outsourced kNN using SCDM 17
indicates that this did not present a significant overhead. The Stage 2 runtimes
were almost the same since the major class was determined over non-encrypted
class labels in both cases.
(a) Standard kNN
(b) SkNN
Fig. 4. Comparison of runtimes using standard kNN and SkNN classification
The effect of the size of a query record, measured in terms of a (number of
attribute values) and the selected value for k was also evaluated. A range of
values for a was considered from 1K to 10K increasing in steps of 1K, coupled
with k = 1, k = 5 and k = 9. The required classification runtime in each case
is plotted in Figure 5. As expected, the runtime increases as the size of the
query record increases, whilst the value of k does not introduce any significant
overhead.
Fig. 5. Average computation costs of SkNN for varying number of k and number of
attributes in query record
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7.4 Classification Accuracy
The classification accuracy obtained using the proposed SkNN was compared
with the accuracy obtained using standard kNN. The aim was to evidence that
SkNN operated correctly; the accuracy values obtained should be comparable.
The UCI evaluation datasets were split into training (the outsourced dataset D)
and testing (the query set Q). Average Precision, Recall and F1 measure [21]
were used as the evaluation metrics obtained using TCV. So as to conduct a
fair comparison the same value for k was used in all cases. The results are pre-
sented in Table 2. From the table it can be seen that from the fifteen datasets
considered, in six cases the results obtained were different (highlighted in bold
font); interestingly in five of the cases SkNN produced a better performance. In
the remaining cases the performance was not as good (lower F1 value recorded
in the context of Arrhythmia). The difference, it was conjectured, was because
the FDH-OPE scheme does not support equality matching in that two identi-
cal plain text values will have different encrypted equivalents because of the δ
random noise added. Sometimes this operated in favour of SkNN by prevent-
ing overfitting. The overall average Precision, Recall and F1 values were 0.71,
0.72 and 0.71 for Standard kNN and 0.72, 0.73 and 0.72 for SkNN, indicating
that both approaches produced similar results and therefor the proposed SkNN
operated correctly.
Table 2. Comparison of prediction accuracies using Standard kNN and SkNN (differing
results highlighted in bold font)
no. UCI DataSet
Standard kNN SkNN
Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
1. Arrhythmia 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23
2. Banknote Authent. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
3. Blood Transfusion 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61
4. Breast Cancer 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63
5. Breast Tissue 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
6. Chronic Kidney 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.82
7. Dermatology 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92
8. Ecoli 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.65 0.69 0.67
9. Indian Liver Patient 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
10. Iris 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
11. Libras Movement 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87
12. Lung Cancer 0.45 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.52
13. Parkinsons 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.81
14. Pima Disease 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
15. Seeds 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Average 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.72
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7.5 Security Under The Semi-Honest Model
Using the SkNN approach, the TPDM and QUs are assumed to be non-colluding
parties and the TPDM is considered to be a “passive adversary” who follows the
semi-honest model where the proposed solution (algorithms and protocols) are
honestly executed. This assumption is reasonable since the primary objective of
CSPs, acting as TPDMs offering DMaaS, is to deliver a high quality services
to clients (DOs). The privet data of a DO and the privet queries of a QU are
not shared with any other parties in the proposed system. The TPDM is the
only party who gains access to the encrypted dataset D′, SCDM and the query
binding records. No decryption takes place at the TPDM side which implies even
more security.
To better evaluate the strength of the proposed scheme, potential attacks
were divided into two categories according to the knowledge H that the attacker
possess:
Low-Level: The attacker only has access to cyphertexts; the encrypted dataset
(D′), the encrypted CDM (SCDM) and the encrypted binding records; thus
H =< D′, SCDM,BindRec′′1 , BindRec
′
2 >. In terms of cryptography a Low-
Level attack therefore corresponds to a Cyphertext Only Attack (COA) [24].
High-Level: Apart from cyphertexts, the attacker also has access to at least
one plaintext record d ∈ D (but not the corresponding cyphertext for d in
D′); thus H =< D′, d >. The attacker may then be able to obtain knowledge
concerning the distribution and/or frequency of records in D. In terms of
cryptography a High-Level attack corresponds to a Known Plaintext Attack
(KPA).
High-Level attacks present a greater threat than Low-Level attacks.
Liu’s HE scheme, used to encryptD (and the second level encryption for bind-
ing record BindRec1), has been shown to be semantically secure [17], which in
turn means that the SkNN approach is secure against Low-Level attacks (COAs).
Deriving any information from accessing cyphertexts generated using Liu’s HE
scheme will be computationally expensive due to the semantically secure fea-
tures incorporated into the scheme, the likely success of a Low-Level attacks is
therefore negligible. In the context of the proposed FDH-OPE scheme, used to
encrypt CDMs and binding records (the first level of encryption in the case of
binding record BindRec1), a feature of the scheme is that different cyphers are
generated given plaintext values (by adding noise). The likelihood of an adver-
sary being able to determine any information given an encrypted record d′ is
therefore negligible, hence the threat of a successful Low-Level attack is mini-
mal. High-Level attacks directed at the FDH-OPE scheme, where the attacker
attempts to obtain knowledge of the statistical make-up of the dataset (the data
distribution and/or data frequency), are of greater concern. However, the pro-
posed FDH-OPE scheme utilises the concept of “message space splitting” and
“non-linear cypher space expansion” to obscure the data distribution in the gen-
erated cyphertexts, and a one-to-many encryption function to obscure the data
frequency, thus protecting against the threat of High-Level attacks.
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7.6 Scalability
The scalability of the proposed SkNN approach was measured in terms of: (i) the
resource required to generate SCDMs compared to other comparable approaches
from the literature, namely the Updateable Distance Matrices (UDMs) mech-
anism presented in [2]; (ii) the potential for extending the SkNN approach to
support different data mining algorithms; and (iii) the potential of extending the
approach in the context of collaborative data mining involving a number of DOs.
In terms of the required memory resources the linear chain feature of SCDMs
reduces the number of elements in a SCDM compared to a UDM. This is illus-
trated in Figure 6 which shows the number of SCDM and UDM elements with
respect to a sequence of datasets increasing in size from r = 1K to r = 10K in
steps of 1K (a kept constant throughout at a = 100). As shown in the figure, the
number of UDM elements grows exponentially with the dataset size. More for-
mally the number of elements in a UDM equates to r(r+1)×a2 , while the number
of elements in a SCDM equates to (r − 1) × a. The reduced memory require-
ment associated with SCDMs, compared to UDMs, facilitates the scalability of
the proposed SkNN approach. The small number of elements in a SCDM also
means that the time required to calculate the SCDM is less than that required
for the UDM. In terms of extending the proposed SkNN approach to address
alternative data mining algorithms, the SCDM concept can support any data
mining algorithm that involve distance comparison. For example three different
clustering algorithms, founded on the idea of SCDMs, were presented in [3]: Se-
cure k-Means (Sk-Means), Secure DBSCAN (SDBSCAN) and Secure Nearest
Neighbour clustering (SNNC). With respect to the concept of collaborative data
mining, where a number of DOs pool their data for analysis so as to gain some
mutual advantage, the proposed SkNN approach can be adapted so that the idea
of Super SCDMs (SSCDMs), as presented in [4], is supported. Note that in [4] a
mechanism was presented whereby SCDMs belonging to a number of DOs could
be “bind” to produce a Super SCDM (SSCDM) which could then be used in the
context of collaborative data clustering.
Fig. 6. Number of elements in UDM and SCDM for different number of records in
dataset (a = 100)
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper the SkNN approach to secure kNN querying (classification) has
been presented that features a novel cryptographic approach. The approach del-
egates the required data analysis to a Third Party Data Miner (TPDM), the
assumption is that this will typically be a Cloud Service Provider. SkNN op-
erates in such a way that the data confidentiality of the Data Owner’s (DO’s)
dataset D and the Query User’s (QU’s) query set Q is maintained; the dataset
D belonging to the DO and the query set Q belonging to a QU are never shared.
The mechanism operates using the concept of Secure Chain Distance Matrices
(SCDMs), encrypted using a proposed Frequency and Distribution Hiding Order
Preserving Encryption (FDH-OPE) scheme, which are generated by the DO and
sent to the TPDM. For a query q ∈ Q to be resolved by the TPDM using the
SCDM received from the DO the distance information concerning q needs to be
incorporated into the SCDM. To do this q first needs to be encrypted using the
same FDH-OPE encryption as used by the DO to encrypt the SCDM. However,
given that the FDH-OPE scheme is a symmetric scheme, it is not appropriate
for the DO to share the FDH-OPE key with the QU. Instead the relevant FDH-
OPE encryption parameters, encrypted using Liu’s Scheme, are sent to the QU
who can then encrypt q without decrypting the received parameters. The effect
is that q is double encrypted (using Liu’s scheme and the FDH-OPE scheme) to
give q′′. This is facilitated through a proposed Secure Query Cyphering (SQC)
protocol. However, q′′ is never shared with the TPDM. What the TPDM needs
to resolve the query is to include the difference between the query record and
the first record in D into the SCDM, essentially adding an additional row at the
start of the SCDM. This is achieved by both the DO and the QU each generat-
ing an encrypted “binding” record, the DO with respect to the first record in D
and the QU with respect to q′′, and sending them to the TPDM who creates a
“pivot” record to add to the SCDM. The process of the DO generating a binding
record and sending it to the TPDM indicates authorisation for the resolution of
the query. The TPDM then resolves the query, using a Nearest Neighbour (NN)
search facilitated by the contents of the SCDM and returns the major class label
to the QU. The proposed SkNN approach was evaluated by: comparing its opera-
tion with standard kNN, considering the security level provided by the approach
and analysing the potential for scalability. The evaluation indicated that: (i) the
SkNN approach operated in a manner comparable to Standard kNN (sometimes
better) without entailing a significant runtime overhead; (ii) was robust against
Low-Level (Cyphertext Only) and High-Level (Known Plaintext) attacks; (iii)
had the potential to operate using “Big Data” datasets; and (iv) be applicable
to other data mining activities that entail distance comparison and alternative
forms of collaborative data mining.
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